Pakistan has little incentive to fight India symmetrically. Its approach will mirror the logic demonstrated by Iran—avoid decisive engagements, impose persistent costs, and exploit escalation limits.
It gave a glimpse into its thought process during Operation Sindoor. After imposing costs on the Indian Air Force through counter-air operations in the first hour of the conflict, the Pakistan Air Force remained cocooned in hardened shelters for the next 87 hours. Pakistan switched to drone swarms launching approximately over the next 72 hours, but only focused on military targets saturated with India’s integrated air defence. In the same period, the IAF focused on the destruction of Pakistan’s air defence, electronic warfare and deception—enabling air strikes on the night of 9 May 2025, going into 10 May 2025, with impunity across the length and breadth of Pakistan. Pakistan’s strategy was correct, but execution was poor. Moreover, Pakistan lacked missile power and quality drones.
But here’s what my experience tells me Pakistan will do in the next round. It will upgrade its fighter aircraft with long-range air-to-air missiles, thicken its air defence, acquire better missiles and drones, harden its defence infrastructure and adopt subterranean warfare to the extent possible. Its asymmetric strategy will manifest in target selection, proxies/agents in the Indian hinterland and maritime operations.
Pakistan will use air, missile and drone attacks not only on military targets, but will deliberately target major cities for psychological and political impact. It would dare India to lose its moral high ground by replicating the same, creating a dilemma for decision makers.
Pakistan will also target critical infrastructure, like power grids, oil refineries, petroleum depots, transport hubs, and communications networks, to disrupt daily life.
In conjunction with China, it could launch cyber attacks on the economic and financial networks of banks, digital payment systems and stock exchanges. The aim is not destruction, but temporary paralysis with disproportionate effect.
Pakistan has been waging a terrorism driven proxy war in J&K and in since 1990. This war was symbolised by an AK-47-wielding and grenade-throwing terrorist who could also plant improvised explosive devices. These terrorists/agents are now likely to be armed with the most democratised high-end military technology—drones—in the hinterland of India. With , all military, civilian, economic, infrastructure and leadership targets will face attacks from the rear.
The maritime domain is another arena for asymmetric warfare. Of course, rival navies will fight for sea control/denial, but in the asymmetric domain, it may extend to targeting of commercial ships and tankers using drones and missiles. Harbours used by commercial ships can be mined. Up to 500-600 km, will play a big role in sea denial for commercial shipping. Its range can be extended by refuelling.
Empirically, great powers seek a quick victory based on their military prowess. In my view, due to the uncertainty of the outcome, the probability of a limited war with China is low. However, keeping in view India’s rise and assertion on the borders, China may use force to embarrass India and reassert its hegemony.
Like the US, it would seek a quick victory in a conflict, limited in time and space, without hard-slogging conventional operations in the mountains. India’s political aim would be to impose a strategic defeat by sustaining China’s technology-driven attack and neutralising any gains with an asymmetrical operational strategy.
During the crisis in Eastern Ladakh, we responded passively to China’s preemptive offensive to secure control of approximately 1000 square km with a massive counter deployment. It achieved a strategic stalemate but failed to restore the status quo ante during negotiations due to a lack of leverage. Geography allows China a first-mover advantage, so India has to go beyond passive confrontation.
I highlighted in my that the best defence against the air campaign of a superior adversary is the adoption of subterranean warfare. It must be adopted in letter and spirit. In addition, we must create an optimum air defence capability. Our conventional response, in the form of a counter-air campaign and ground operations, must escalate to other sectors of the vast border where we have a terrain advantage.
The is China’s economic lifeline. The Andaman and Nicobar islands are strategically located west of the strait. The Indian Navy can blockade the strait or impose “denial” on China-related commercial shipping. A similar action in the Arabian Sea to deny access to Gwadar, Pasni, and Karachi ports will have a cascading impact on the Chinese economy. The advantages of creating a “mosquito fleet” for interfering with commercial shipping are obvious.
The Dalai Lama, the religious and political head of the Tibetan nation, and a government in exile are based in India. In the public domain, there are reports of 10,000 to 12,000 trained as who, so far, have been used conventionally in our conflicts. In relation to our borders, Tibet is China’s Achilles Heel. If China does not respect our sovereignty, I find no reason why the war must not be taken to Tibet. Consequently, our asymmetrical targets must be carefully chosen and focus primarily on the PLA. The Tibetan Special Forces can be infiltrated to target the PLA’s rear areas and coordinate the Tibetan freedom struggle.
Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the adversary or capitalise on limited preparation against the
threat. They rely primarily on concepts of operations fundamentally different from those of the adversary and from those of recent history. This is not new. Military history is replete with examples from the Trojan War to the Strait of Hormuz.
There is no compartmentalisation between conventional and strategies. It is just that nations and militaries get conditioned to fighting wars in a particular way. And anything done differently produces asymmetry, for which little or no preparation has been done. Of course, asymmetric strategies can be countered, but a reaction as opposed to preemption has obvious disadvantages.
China, India, and Pakistan are modern armies that have to wage conflict below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold, there are obvious constraints in the way conflict will manifest. Asymmetric strategies enable the weaker military to stalemate the adversary and impose a strategic defeat. The military challenge is to preempt or neutralise the asymmetric strategy of the weaker adversary and exploit it against a superior adversary.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)
