In 1947, India was able to retain control over the Srinagar airfield by the skin of its teeth. Thanks to the gallant efforts by the 1 Sikh under the able command of Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai and the Dakotas from No. 12 Squadron of the Indian Air Force, India was able to beat back the marauding hordes of Pakistani militia, who had advanced to within 30 miles of the airfield. Subsequently, in the wars of 1965 and 1971, Srinagar received frequent visits from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
Notably, IAF’s sole Param Vir Chakra was awarded to Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon for his intrepid bravery in air action over Srinagar on 14 December 1971. More recently, as part of Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos, Pakistan launched air attacks on Srinagar airfield on 10 May 2025. The attacks involved drones, missiles, and fighter jets.
It was a very determined attack, and the PAF was willing to take greater risks. However, despite these attacks, the Srinagar airfield remained operational and IAF’s military operations continued unabated. These attacks highlighted Pakistan’s intent to neutralise Srinagar’s operational capacity, underscoring the need for robust defence strategies in the face of evolving threats.
The air operations during India’s Operation Sindoor, which started on 7 May, and Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos (10 May) revealed a new paradigm in aerial warfare. Pakistan deployed advanced technologies, including swarm drones, kamikaze drones with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) capabilities, long-range standoff weapons effective beyond 100 km, and beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles with ranges exceeding 200 km.
These systems pose a multifaceted threat to Srinagar Airfield, complicating India’s ability to maintain air control.
Geographically, Srinagar’s proximity to the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border (IB) exacerbates its vulnerability. The LoC sectors at Uri, Baramulla, and Tangdhar are only 60–70 km away, while the IB at Akhnoor is 120 km. Pakistan’s Qadri Airbase in Skardu, at 160 km from Srinagar, can house advanced PAF fighters like the J-10C, F-16, and JF-17. Closer bases at Kotli and Rawalakot, approximately 100 km away, can support helicopters and drone operations. In a broader conflict, PAF could deploy assets from distant bases, as far as PAF Base Masroor in Karachi, leveraging AAR (air-to-air refueling) and long-range precision weapons to target Srinagar.
The PAF’s modernised inventory, including data-linked fighters and Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems, enhances its operational reach. A Combat Air Patrol (CAP) operating 100–150 km from Srinagar, within Pakistani airspace, could engage IAF fighters as they take off, particularly as they clear the crest line of surrounding terrain. That’s when they’d be most vulnerable. Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, with ranges exceeding 200 km, enable PAF to neutralise airborne threats before they gain altitude or can manoeuvre effectively to get into an advantageous position.
Additionally, swarm drones and kamikaze drones with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) features can target radar and air defence systems, while surface-launched missiles and forward-deployed artillery threaten the airfield’s infrastructure. A saturation strike, combining these elements, could disable the runway or critical facilities for hours, disrupting IAF operations at a critical juncture.
The 10 May 10 attack, while symbolic, was limited in scale. Future PAF operations, potentially coordinated with ground manoeuvres from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or a thrust into the Akhnoor bulge, could involve a larger, more sustained assault. Such a scenario would test India’s defensive capabilities, particularly if Pakistan employs a combination of pre-emptive strikes and persistent aerial threats to overwhelm Srinagar’s defences.
Defending Srinagar Airfield against these emerging threats requires addressing a complex array of challenges: slow-moving drones, suicide drones, ARMs, surface-to-air missiles, long-range artillery, and air-launched precision weapons. The airfield’s proximity to hostile bases and enemy’s airspace makes it vulnerable to standoff attacks, which necessitate a re-evaluation of traditional air defence strategies. A saturation strike could temporarily disable the runway, grounding IAF fighters, while a BVR-armed PAF CAP loitering within kill ranges could neutralise aircraft attempting to take off. Both scenarios undermine India’s ability to maintain air superiority over Srinagar, a cornerstone of our air strategy.
India’s current air defence posture in this area relies on maintaining “guns tight” protocols, where surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defence weapons engage only after clearance to avoid fratricide. This cautious approach, while necessary to prevent blue-on-blue (friendly fire) incidents, limits the responsiveness of ground-based defences against fast-evolving threats like swarm drones or low-flying kamikaze drones. Moreover, deploying IAF fighters from Srinagar itself is increasingly precarious, as PAF’s AEW&C and BVR capabilities can detect and engage aircraft shortly after take-off.
Pakistan’s recent attack, though unsuccessful in causing significant damage, exposed vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a larger-scale operation. Pakistan’s willingness to take greater risks, as demonstrated in Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos, suggests that future attacks may prioritise saturation and coordination to overwhelm defences. The IAF cannot afford to assume that Srinagar’s operational resilience will hold against a more determined assault, particularly in the context of a theatre-wide conflict.
It is a fact that, based on our own capabilities, we can create similar problems for the other side. However, this analysis focuses solely on the challenges of defending Srinagar and the Kashmir valley in general.
To counter these threats, India could leverage its strengths against Pakistan’s vulnerabilities by adopting an air denial over the traditional pursuit of air superiority. India’s ground-based air defence infrastructure, bolstered by the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and Akashteer for detection, and systems like the S-400, Barak-8 and Akash SAM for engagement, provides a formidable foundation.
The S-400, with a detection range of 600 km and effective kill range of up to 400 km, can engage targets well beyond the IB/ LoC, deep into Pakistan’s airspace. The medium/short range SAMs and air defence guns could provide additional layers of protection. By shifting to a “guns free” default mode, instead of “guns tight”, India could create a no-fly zone extending 400 km from Srinagar, making it prohibitively risky for PAF aircraft to operate, even within their own airspace.
This air denial strategy would involve keeping IAF fighters grounded at dispersed locations within Srinagar airfield, housed in hardened aircraft shelters (HAS), or relocating them to nearby bases. When needed, IAF fighters equipped with long-range BVR missiles, supported by airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), could operate from other bases to provide local air superiority over Srinagar without exposing themselves to a direct attack on the ground. This approach maximises the freedom of engagement for ground-based defences, allowing SAMs and guns to freely engage any aerial threat within range, regardless of the threat’s origin.
The air denial strategy exploits Pakistan’s reliance on airborne platforms to target Srinagar by making them extremely vulnerable to formidable air defence architecture on ground. This would deter PAF, and should they wish to press home the attack, they would have to expend significant additional resources to penetrate the airspace. The psychological and operational impact of such a strategy could disrupt PAF’s planning, as the risk of heavy losses outweighs potential gains.
For an Air Force, led by fighter pilots, that worships at the altar of air superiority, this would be a bitter pill to swallow. Having been one myself, I understand that we consider gaining and maintaining control of the air as the primary airpower role. For IAF, air superiority is primus inter pares.
The air denial strategy could seem like a defensive move.
The air denial strategy draws inspiration from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egyptian forces established a dense air defence network along the Suez Canal, denying the Israeli Air Force operational freedom. While Israel eventually regained air superiority, it did so at a significant cost in blood and treasure despite enjoying a significant technological advantage over Egypt. Pakistan, lacking a similar edge over India’s advanced air defence systems, faces a steeper challenge. India’s S-400, Akashteer, and IACCS provide a robust detection and engagement capability, making an air denial strategy viable.
For the IAF, steeped in a culture that prioritises air superiority, adopting air denial may seem counterintuitive. Air superiority, often considered the primary role of airpower, ensures control of the skies for offensive and defensive operations. However, in Srinagar’s unique context—geographically constrained, close to hostile bases, and facing advanced threats—air denial offers a pragmatic alternative.
By neutralising PAF’s ability to operate anywhere near Srinagar, India can maintain operational continuity at the airfield, without relying on fighter aircraft to man the operational readiness platform (ORP) or being airborne as part of an around-the-clock CAP from Srinagar.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)
