This total excludes India’s borders with Nepal and Bhutan, two neighbours with whom New Delhi’s ties are far more stable than with the rest of the region. Relations with Myanmar may not yet be beyond salvage. But with the US and Russia dipping their fingers into a pie dominated by China, there are no guarantees. Ties with Bangladesh were smooth until Sheikh Hasina was ousted as Prime Minister. Since then, Dhaka has moved closer to Pakistan. And during Operation Sindoor, China laid its cards on the table.
In such a fraught neighbourhood, the old diplomatic principle — ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ — is no longer an option for India. It urgently needs to find alternative strategies to prevent a crisis from erupting in the east.
For the first time since Operation Sindoor — and the fifth since 2017 — China flexed its muscle earlier this week at the Arunachal Pradesh border by renaming places within the Indian state. This time, the number of places renamed was 27 — including five inhabited areas, 15 mountains, four passes, two rivers, and a lake — three fewer than last year. Had these claims been made during Operation Sindoor, India would have found it harder to dismiss them as “vain and preposterous,” as mere PSYOPs or propaganda. Beijing’s backing of Islamabad in the past week has left India in no doubt: Pakistan, long considered India’s foe, is now firmly China’s friend — and vice versa.
A recovery in India’s relationship with Bangladesh, which went downhill following the ouster of Hasina last August, seems unlikely for now. The latest blow: the interim government, led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, has banned Hasina’s party, the Awami League. Hasina is in exile in New Delhi. Dhaka has formally requested her extradition so she can be tried for alleged “crimes against humanity” in Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal. India has not responded. Extradition is not an option — New Delhi favours early elections in that country. But in the meantime, Dhaka slips further into Islamabad’s embrace.
Myanmar, meanwhile, holds strategic value for India on many fronts. It is the only land bridge to Southeast Asia. When the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway are completed, they will change the parameters of trade and security in the region. India also maintains ties with the junta to counter China’s influence and preserve its access to the strategic Bay of Bengal.
That very influence drew US attention. In 2022, Washington passed the Burma Act, pledging “humanitarian aid, support for the democracy movement, and sanctions against those persons/entities funding the unlawful regime.” But Donald Trump’s withdrawal of foreign aid has significantly reduced US involvement. China’s domination in Myanmar now goes largely unchallenged.
The UN Secretary-General’s March proposal to establish a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh to Myanmar’s Rakhine province — to facilitate the return of displaced Rohingyas — has divided opinion in Dhaka. If the plan proceeds, its fallout is something India will have to watch closely.
After the showdown on its western front and the global ripples that followed, India’s plate is full. The last thing it needs is to leave its eastern flank vulnerable to proxy wars that could prove just as debilitating — and just as costly — as a direct military confrontation.
(Edited by Prashant)
