Such observations conveniently glossed over a couple of things. The first, an incontestable political fact and the second, a constitutional obligation flowing from the need to preserve democratic legitimacy.
Had Arlekar sworn in Vijay on the strength of his existing numbers, he would have sailed through a vote of confidence. The last thing the major Opposition parties want, and probably most minor ones as well, is to precipitate another election. Also, Arlekar was obliged to chart a course that would not only respect the mandate but discourage political brokering and opportunistic deal-making. The delay did just that. It led to more than just mere horse-trading, but a full-fledged cattle auction in a morally bankrupt marketplace.
One of the backroom stories that large sections of the media have either played down or swept aside is the shocking fact that rival parties—the DMK and the AIADMK—were negotiating to form an alternative government. Who came up with the idea first, and which party would support the other is much less relevant than the fact these two, in a curious choreography of contradictions, were actively considering what most analysts would have dismissed as impossible only a couple of days earlier.
We are that the DMK President Stalin, who earlier said he was happy to respect the mandate and sit in the opposition, was against forging such an alternative. But this doesn’t explain what pressures led him to personally seek such an arrangement with some of his minor allies. The CPI(M) General Secretary, MA Baby, clearly said on television that his party’s support was sought by the DMK for an arrangement under which it would support an AIADMK-led government, ostensibly from the outside. Of course, Baby walked that back a couple of days later by saying that all talk of a DMK-AIADMK alliance was just a rumour.
Despite this unconvincing retraction, the Left parties deserve some credit for consistently maintaining that the mandate for Vijay’s TVK needs to be respected. So do those members of the DMK, some close to the ruling dispensation, who opposed the iniquitous alliance.
There was a, this time to make Thol.Thirumavalavan, whose VCK had bagged a mere two seats, the Chief Minister with the support of the DMK-AIADMK. In comparison, such arithmetical audacity makes Chandra Shekhar appear overloaded in terms of numbers when he was sworn in as Prime Minister in 1991.
The impact of this election goes well beyond someone’s victory and another’s defeat. The Palaniswami-led AIADMK, for instance, has not merely lost, but looks on the verge of a split with a sizeable section of legislators openly defying the general secretary. The official for the rebellion is Palaniswami’s self-serving attempt to become the Chief Minister with DMK support. But the underlying causes include successive defeats and the AIADMK’s poor performance in the western Kongu region, regarded as Palaniswami’s stronghold, given the influence of his agrarian Gounder community.
With rebel leaders such as CV Shanmugam, SP Velumani and others declaring they would support the TVK government, Vijay has received an unexpected boost. Whether this rebellion has the backing of ‘Delhi’ and whether the BJP leadership will use it for the party’s advantage is worth keeping an eye on.
Although it is too early to say, if this rebel support is unconditional, then Vijay’s dependence on the four minor parties—the CPI(M), CPI, VCK and IUML—that have pledged support, but declared they will remain within the DMK fold will either diminish or disappear altogether.
This would weaken the DMK’s post-election influence even further.
Apart from the Congress jumping ship, the election results have shown there is a worrying overlap between the TVK’s main political constituency and DMK’s—Dalits, minorities and youth. Going forward, as long as Vijay remains a potent political force, it would appear that the contours of future contests will be shaped by the battle for these very constituencies.
If the AIADMK does collapse under the weight of its own splits, then the expression ‘two Dravidian majors’ may assume an altogether different meaning.
The TVK has its own share of problems, which range from inheriting a massive public debt to running a government with inexperienced leaders. Its mandate was partly secured with the lofty pledge of stamping out corruption and ushering in a new brand of governance. But such promises that are far easier to make than keep.
However, what Vijay has in his favour is that nobody—neither political parties nor the people—wants another election now or in the near future. Given the mood in Tamil Nadu, it would be political suicide to attempt to bring him down. This gives him an opportunity to project strength rather than self-preservation, to show he is cut from steel rather than from the cloth of survival.
Apart from grace, he has shown a certain confidence in visiting the houses of other leaders, particularly Stalin, an act which will hopefully restore a measure of civility in a state where personal rivalries have been a defining feature of politics. He will need more of this conviction and self-assurance going forward.
In order to survive, he may have to be fearless rather than accommodating. A willingness to be defeated may be the very thing that brings him further victories.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)
