Given this complex interdependence, the logical course for India would have been to maintain equidistance from the warring parties, offer its services as an honest broker if necessary and stick to its traditional stance of upholding a “” that has served India well for several decades. This would at a minimum have meant postponing the state visit to Israel and offering condolences on—if not criticising—the illegal of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei.
First, we bizarrely signalled a tilt toward Israel with a Prime Ministerial visit on the eve of a war that everyone and their uncle knew was likely. Second, we remained silent when Khamenei was assassinated (rules, anyone?) and the Modi government went so far as to instruct heads of mission worldwide Iranian condolence books before reversing course and sending the Foreign Secretary—rather than a Cabinet Minister—to sign the Iranian Embassy’s condolence book. Third, we mutely accepted the sinking of the IRIS Dena, an Iranian naval vessel, by the US Navy just days after that ship had visited India as our guest for the MILAN naval exercises.
We had nothing to say about the assault on Iran, but co-sponsored a UN resolution condemning Iran’s attacks on its Persian Gulf neighbours. The latter step was understandable given our ties to the Gulf, but only highlighted our strange silence on the attack on Iran itself. And now we are reduced to the Iranian government to let stranded Indian ships sail out of the Persian Gulf.
Some analysts have presented the Opposition’s demand for a stronger Indian response to the attack on Iran as a “” or an attempt to attain some level of ““. But a fearful silence is not the only alternative to full-throated condemnation. What is the point of getting a seat at the “global high table” if you are going to remain mute? As former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, “It’s not strategic to keep your mouth shut”.
Manmohan Singh—who did more than any other Prime Minister to promote India-US relations—had the confidence to calmly state, during his July 2005 official visit to the US, that the invasion of Iraq ““.
Nor has India’s deference to Washington been rewarded. The Trump administration reduced—but did not eliminate—punitive tariffs only after India opened up its market; and that too was unnecessary since the US Supreme Court struck down the tariffs just two weeks later. The US announced in New Delhi that it would India’s export competitiveness and would “” India to temporarily buy Russian oil for the next 30 days. Not to forget how Trump publicly announced—65 times at last count—that he had ended Operation Sindoor, and invited Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir to lunch at the White House.
So where do we go from here? Events will play themselves out, and India can only hope that the disruption to energy markets will be contained. Iran wants to make this as painful for the US as it can, and India will suffer the collateral damage. The government has no choice but to engage with Iran to try to ameliorate its impact.
Modi didn’t even try to prevent a war that has the potential to devastate the Indian economy and his own political capital. History is instructive here. The 1973 oil shock fed the political turmoil in India that ended in the Emergency. The 1979 oil shock helped sweep out the Janata government in India and Jimmy Carter in the US. As a political actor, Modi is incentivised to do everything he can to protect the Indian economy and his political capital from an oil shock. The fact that he signalled a tilt toward the US and Israel suggests that he is acting against both his own and his country’s interests. The question remains unanswered: Whose interest is he serving?
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)
